Self-Defence and IHL: Reconciling Necessity and Restraint in the Middle East

by Cesar Jaramillo | November 27, 2025

“Even wars have limits.”
International Committee of the Red Cross

Gaza as a Test of Law and Principle

The devastation that has been inflicted upon Gaza constitutes a defining test for the international order – not just of its capacity to respond effectively to atrocity, but of its commitment to the very rules that separate legality from lawlessness and that prevent the legitimate use of force from sliding into barbarism.

Throughout this conflict, the invocation of Israel’s right to defend itself has become a reflex, a political refrain used to deflect scrutiny of conduct that should instead be judged by the laws of war. The tension between the right of self-defence and the obligations of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) has rarely been so stark, or so consequential.

Even if a ceasefire holds, these issues cannot be dismissed as relics of a painful chapter. The failures in understanding – and, at times, the deliberate distortion of – the relationship between self-defence and humanitarian restraint must be acknowledged lest they become normalized, embedding a dangerous precedent about what is deemed acceptable in wartime.

With the scale of destruction and the deep psychological and societal trauma that may take generations to heal, truth and accountability are not distractions from peace but prerequisites for it. Without them, any stability that follows will be fragile, and the moral and legal foundations of the international order will remain gravely compromised.

In public discourse, these two legal regimes are too often portrayed as competing frameworks, as though the right of self-defence somehow exempts a state from the rules of war. That false dichotomy has enabled unprecedented civilian harm to be rationalized as unavoidable, proportional, or even lawful.

In reality, the right of self-defence and IHL are not mutually exclusive. They coexist, and the legitimacy of the former depends on adherence to the latter.

The Middle East, and Gaza in particular, illustrates the global cost of misunderstanding this relationship. Each strike that flouts IHL not only devastates lives but chips away at the universality of the laws designed to protect them. Each silence from states that claim to champion a rules-based order weakens that order further.

The Legal Framework: Necessity, Proportionality, and Restraint

The right of self-defence is enshrined in Article 51 of the UN Charter, a foundational recognition that states may respond to armed attack. Yet this right is neither absolute nor unbounded. Its exercise is conditioned by two core principles: necessity and proportionality.

Israel has legitimate and profound security concerns, and the government has both the right and the duty to protect its population. But the legitimacy of that right does not extend to methods that disregard humanitarian law. The protection of civilians and the proportionality of force remain binding obligations under any circumstance.

IHL, codified in the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols, governs the conduct of hostilities once conflict begins. It establishes binding rules: distinction between combatants and civilians, proportionality in the use of force, and precaution in attack. Together, these principles exist to protect those not, or no longer, participating in hostilities.

Crucially, these legal frameworks operate in parallel, not in sequence. Self-defence may justify the resort to force; IHL constrains its application. To invoke one while disregarding the other is to weaponize law itself. The legitimacy of military action cannot rest solely on the legality of its initiation; it must be measured equally by the humanity of its conduct.

However, the discourse surrounding Gaza has laid bare a pattern of distortion. The invocation of self-defence has too often served as a rhetorical shield against scrutiny of conduct that plainly violates IHL.

The obligation to comply with IHL extends to all parties. Hamas’ deliberate targeting of civilians, indiscriminate rocket fire, and the taking of hostages are clear violations of these same rules and merit strong, unequivocal denunciation. But such crimes do not absolve Israel, or any state, from its own legal constraints. This universality is not a moral luxury but a legal necessity that ensures no actor may claim exemption on the basis of grievance.

Civilian death on a staggering scale, attacks on hospitals and schools, the weaponization of starvation, or the deliberate obstruction of humanitarian aid constitute acts that cannot be excused under the banner of security.

When states echo the language of justification rather than legality, they erode the very framework that underpins their own security. To tolerate IHL violations in Gaza under the pretext of solidarity is to invite their repetition elsewhere. The integrity of international law is indivisible; if it can be selectively applied, it can be universally ignored.

Exceptionalism and the Erosion of Universality

The claim of exceptional circumstances, including that the threat is unprecedented, the adversary uniquely ruthless, or the environment too complex for IHL compliance, has become the recurring refrain of those seeking to blur the limits of IHL. Yet history shows that it is precisely in such moments of extremity that legal and moral constraints are most essential.

The selective application of these principles continues to be corrosive in the Middle East, where perceptions of double standards already fuel disillusionment with the so-called rules-based order. The message that some states are bound by law while others are shielded by politics deepens resentment and weakens incentives for restraint across the region.

For liberal democracies that define themselves as champions of international law, this double standard is more than hypocrisy; it is strategic self-harm. The credibility of their advocacy for human rights, accountability, and the protection of civilians depends on a willingness to apply these standards universally, including to allies.

Of course, the erosion of IHL in Gaza does not stop at Gaza. It reverberates throughout the region, shaping the calculus of actors who may see impunity rewarded and restraint punished. In Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen, violations of humanitarian norms have already become normalized, often under the same rationales of self-defence or counterterrorism.

The precedent is dangerous. If self-defence is interpreted as a license for disproportionate force, occupation, or collective punishment, then the very architecture of restraint collapses. The humanitarian norms developed in response to the horrors of the twentieth century risk being rendered obsolete in this one.

Moreover, the undermining of IHL fuels radicalization. When civilian suffering is dismissed as collateral, the legitimacy of lawful governance erodes and extremist narratives find fertile ground. Upholding IHL, then, is not only a moral imperative but a strategic one. It affirms that law, not vengeance, is the basis of legitimate security.

Restoring Credibility: A Principled Path Forward

The Middle East does not need new laws. It needs renewed adherence to the ones already written and a collective insistence that they apply to all. Liberal democracies, in particular, must abandon the habit of conflating empathy with exemption, where the suffering of some justifies the excesses of others.

A principled defence of IHL requires both moral courage and political cost. It means rejecting the notion that legality can be suspended in the name of solidarity. It means restoring clarity to the relationship between the right of self-defence and the duty of restraint. It also means holding accountable those who systematically violate humanitarian norms, regardless of their alignment or alliances.

Practical steps exist: independent investigations of alleged war crimes, the consistent application of arms-export controls, and unequivocal support for international accountability mechanisms. These are not acts of hostility toward Israel or any other state; they are expressions of fidelity to law and humanity.

The ongoing war in Gaza has made clear that the true contest is not between Israel and Hamas alone, but between the principles of restraint and the politics of impunity. The legitimacy of the right of self-defence depends on the credibility of the humanitarian law that governs it. The credibility of international law will not be restored by new resolutions or rhetorical commitments. It will be restored when states once again accept that even wars have limits – and that those limits apply equally to all.

  • Paper presented at the 63rd Meeting of the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs. Hiroshima, Japan. November 2025.

Cesar Jaramillo is Executive Director at SANE Policy Institute.

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