The Modernization-as-Safety Mirage

by Cesar Jaramillo | May 21, 2026

Few obstacles to nuclear abolition are as formidable as the vast, ongoing modernization of nuclear weapons infrastructure. Yet when challenged on the contradiction between these programs and their disarmament obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), officials from nuclear-weapon states often resort to some version of a remarkably disingenuous refrain: “Would you prefer a safe nuclear arsenal or an unsafe one?”

It is a cartoonish dichotomy that they seem to believe is almost impossible to challenge politically. After all, no responsible person would advocate for unsafe nuclear weapons, insecure command-and-control systems, deteriorating infrastructure, or unstable stewardship practices.

The framing is designed to end the conversation before it begins. But that is precisely why it deserves far more scrutiny than it typically receives.

The notion that nuclear modernization is a matter of safety is truthful enough to persist, but misleading enough to demand challenge. It bundles profoundly different activities into a single supposedly benign category. Critically, it obscures the extent to which modernization programs are not merely about maintaining aging systems safely, but about renewing, enhancing, and entrenching nuclear arsenals for generations to come.

Unsurprisingly, no nuclear-armed state presents its modernization programs as inconsistent with its obligations under the NPT. Quite the contrary. They routinely insist that modernization and disarmament are entirely compatible. Some even portray themselves as responsible stewards of the NPT precisely because they are modernizing their arsenals.

Never mind that this framing relies on a sleight of hand.

Maintaining the basic safety and security of existing systems is one thing. Developing new delivery systems, improving accuracy, increasing survivability, upgrading command-and-control networks, rebuilding weapons production complexes, integrating advanced technologies, and extending the operational lifespan of nuclear forces well into the next century is something else entirely.

Efforts to deny or obscure the strategic implications of modernization programs have been on full display during this year’s NPT Review Conference. In the view of nuclear-weapon states, modernization, framed primarily as safety and stewardship, should inspire confidence, perhaps even admiration. But when questions arise regarding the massive modernization of nuclear weapons infrastructure, the response quickly reverts to the familiar formula of safe versus unsafe nuclear arsenals.

Preparing for Abolition, or Perpetuity?

The sheer scale of contemporary modernization programs makes the argument that they are simply about safety increasingly untenable. A 2024 feature in The New York Times laid out the vast scope of the United States’ “once-in-a-generation” overhaul of its nuclear weapons infrastructure, spanning warheads, missiles, submarines, bombers, laboratories, production facilities, and command infrastructure.

The scale of the undertaking described is difficult to reconcile with the notion of responsible stewardship pending eventual abolition. The overhaul extends across every leg of the U.S. nuclear triad and includes the replacement or modernization of intercontinental ballistic missiles, ballistic missile submarines, strategic bombers, warheads, production facilities, laboratories, and command-and-control infrastructure.

The article also highlights the enormous industrial and institutional ecosystem sustaining these efforts, involving facilities, contractors, and subcontractors spanning virtually the entire country: 23 states directly, and all 50 when broader subcontracting networks are included.

What emerges is not the image of a reluctant caretaker merely ensuring that aging systems do not become dangerous. It is the image of a state reinvesting in the long-term future of nuclear deterrence at an immense financial and institutional scale. Put simply, the infrastructure being rebuilt is neither designed nor intended for abolition.

More recent reporting by the Arms Control Association (ACA) points to soaring defense and modernization expenditures reaching historic levels, with estimates tied to U.S. nuclear modernization alone now approaching roughly $1.45 trillion over coming decades. These costs extend far beyond warheads and delivery systems to encompass the broader infrastructure required to sustain the nuclear enterprise indefinitely.

The figures are politically and strategically significant because they expose the contradiction at the heart of current NPT discourse: governments continue to affirm their commitment to eventual disarmament while simultaneously committing enormous sums to ensure that nuclear weapons remain credible, modern, and operational far into the future.

The NPT’s Article VI commits states parties to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament. Yet modernization programs increasingly communicate the opposite message – not temporary reliance pending elimination, but permanent reliance requiring continuous reinvestment.

This issue extends far beyond the United States. All nuclear weapons possessors, including those outside the NPT, are engaged in significant modernization efforts. The technologies and doctrines differ, but the underlying logic is the same. Nuclear weapons are presented as enduring features of international security that must remain credible, effective, and adaptable indefinitely.

International security is shaped not only by capabilities themselves, but by what those capabilities communicate about long-term intentions. A state that invests hundreds of billions, or even trillions, of dollars into renewing every leg of its nuclear triad, modernizing warheads, upgrading delivery systems, rebuilding production facilities, and integrating next-generation technologies is embedding nuclear weapons deeply into its future strategic identity.

Moreover, nuclear modernization is not strategically neutral. It shapes threat perceptions, provokes responses, and intensifies pressures for reciprocal buildup. As other states observe modernization programs unfold, they face powerful incentives to respond in kind. Modernization thus becomes inseparable from arms racing dynamics and the gradual erosion of disarmament norms. The result is a global modernization cascade in which every actor claims defensive intent even as all collectively deepen dependence on nuclear weapons.

And, of course, there remains a basic but foundational point: if the objective is greater nuclear safety and security, disarmament is a far more effective path than modernization.

Reducing the number of warheads, delivery systems, deployment sites, and operational infrastructures reduces opportunities for accident, miscalculation, theft, unauthorized use, technical failure, and escalation. Fewer weapons, fewer launch systems, and lower states of readiness are themselves forms of risk reduction.

This should be obvious, yet discussions of nuclear safety often proceed as though the only available pathway is the indefinite maintenance and modernization of large arsenals. The safest nuclear weapon is one that no longer exists.

The distinction between maintaining the safety and security of existing systems and undertaking expansive modernization programs that enhance capabilities and perpetuate nuclear deterrence for generations is both profound and consequential. Public discourse, diplomatic forums, and NPT review processes should reflect this reality far more clearly than they currently do.

If every nuclear-armed state is preparing its arsenal, infrastructure, and doctrine for indefinite future relevance, what exactly remains of the disarmament project beyond rhetoric?

Cesar Jaramillo is Executive Director at SANE Policy Institute.